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 ingdom
of Manipur was merged with the Indian Union on 15 October
1949. However, only after a protracted agitation interspersed
with violence, it was declared a separate state in 1972.
The emergence of insurgency in Manipur is formally traced
to the emergence of the United National Liberation Front
(UNLF) on 24 November 1964. The alleged ‘forced’
merger of Manipur and the delay in the conferring of
full-fledged statehood to it was greatly resented by
the people of Manipur. Since then several other outfits,
like the People's Liberation Army (PLA), founded on
September 25, 1978, People's Revolutionary Party of
Kangleipak (PREPAK) set up on October 9, 1977 and the
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) that came into being
in April, 1980 have emerged in the valley areas consisting
of four districts of the State. All these insurgent
groups have been demanding a separate independent Manipur.
The hill areas of the State, comprising five districts,
have been affected by different brands of militancy.
From Nagaland, violence by the Naga groups has also
spilled over into Manipur, a substantial part of which
is claimed by the Isak-Muivah faction of National Socialist
Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) as part of Nagalim, the
proposed unified territory of the Nagas as claimed by
the Naga rebels. Several clashes between the NSCN-IM
and the Khaplang faction of National Socialist Council
of Nagaland (NSCN-K) have been reported from the hill
districts of the State. Kuki tribals in the early 1990s
initiated their own brand of insurgency against the
alleged oppression by the NSCN-IM. Following ethnic
clashes between the Nagas and Kukis in the early 1990s,
a number of Kuki outfits were formed. Several other
tribes, such as the Paite, Vaiphei and Hmars have also
established their own armed groups. Similarly, Islamist
outfits like the People’s United Liberation Front
(PULF) have also been founded to protect the interests
of the ‘Pangals’ (Manipuri Muslims).
Today, Manipur is one of the worst affected states
in the Northeast where at least 12 insurgent outfits
are active at present. A report of the State Home department
in May 2005 indicated that ‘as many as 12,650
cadres of different insurgent outfits with 8830 weapons
are actively operating in the State’. According
to government sources, the strength of those concentrated
in the valley districts, is assessed at around 1500
cadres for the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF)
and its army wing, the PLA, 2500 cadres for the UNLF
and its army wing Manipur People’s Army (MPA),
500 cadres for the PREPAK and its army wing Red Army,
while Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and its Yawol Lanmi
army is assessed as having a strength of 600 cadres.
The Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)’s strength
is assessed at 100 cadres.
In Manipur, the valley-based outfits have remained
active and the security force operations have made little
difference to their capabilities. The UNLF, PLA, KYKL,
PREPAK and the KCP have been involved in some of the
serious attacks on security forces. The insurgents have
an avowed policy of not targeting the state police personnel,
unless circumstances demand it. The practice of directing
their attack on the Army and the central para-military
personnel is an attempt to create a divide between Manipur
and India and to secure vital popular support.
Unlike other conflict theatres of the Northeast, not
many ‘surrenders’ have been reported from
Manipur, thus indicating the tight control that the
outfits have maintained over their cadres. Armed with
an extremely efficient intelligence network and superior
fire power, the militants have been able to carve out
a number of liberated zones across the State. By the
end of 2007, however, the security forces had managed
to dislodge the militants from most of such zones except
for one in the New Somtal area in Chandel district.
The reign of terror has manifested in other forms as
well, since the rule of the insurgents has combined
with a complete retreat of civil governance. The insurgents
continue to terrorize and extort with impunity, and
people have little option but to obey their diktats.
There are incidents in which militants of the State
have targeted VIPs. One such attack was planned on Chief
Minister Okram Ibobi Singh on November 23, 2007. Incidents
of firing and grenade explosions targeting the residences
of Ministers and Members of the State Legislative Assembly
are still continuing. At present, there are more than
30 militant groups in Manipur (12 are active as stated
above), including 10 KCP factions and 19 Kuki outfits
operating in the state. Naga militant outfits such as
NSCN-IM and NSCN-K are also operating in parts of the
State's hill districts. The Kuki outfits are now in
a mode of Suspension of Operations (SoO) with the Government.
Due to the problem of militancy, the investments meant
for infrastructural development have been divested in
countering the growing unemployment in the State. There
has been increase in educated unemployed youths in the
State and they are now becoming ready recruits for the
militant outfits. The cases of extortion are also increasing.
Militants have resorted to extorting from almost all
places including places of worship, educational institutes,
health centres and commercial establishments. This has
led to closure of quite a few establishments in the
State.
Adding to the woes of the State, the Naga insurgents,
operating from Nagaland and the hills districts of Manipur,
have been dominating the two National Highways, NH-39
and NH-53, imposing taxes on the use of the roads and
subsequent punishment on not paying it. There are 26
permanent and systematic ‘tax’ collection
points along these roads thus hampering Manipur’s
link with Assam and the rest of India.
Another serious problem created by the militants is
the kidnapping of children to train them to become members
of insurgent outfits. There are also incidents of killing
of non-Manipuri by the militants. The media in the State
has also suffered and there had been quite a few incidents
in which media persons have been killed by unidentified
miscreants.
Manipur had been declared a ‘disturbed area’
in its entirety in 1980 and the Armed Forces Special
Power Act (AFSPA) 1958 was imposed in the State on 8
September, 1980, which continues to be in place till
now. The implementation of this Act resulted in the
State witnessing an unprecedented civic uprising, including
the infamous “mothers’ nude protest”
against the Act in July 2004 on the discovery of the
mutilated body of Thangjam Manorama, after she was picked
up by the Assam Rifles and later found dead. The AFSPA
is still embroiled in controversy and the people of
Manipur are continuing their protest against the Act.
Manipur turned tense on the news of the visit of NSCN-IM
general secretary Thuingaleng Muivah to his native village
Somdal in Ukhrul district of Manipur on the first week
of May 2010. The Manipur State Cabinet on April 30,
2010 decided not to allow entry of Muivah in Manipur
as it considered that there are possibilities of disturbances
in the state if the NSCN-IM leader comes to Manipur.
It clamped Section 144 of Cr PC in the Senapati district
and brought in additional forces in order to prevent
entry of Muivah in Manipur. After this decision of the
government, seven Naga MLAs resigned protesting the
move. On May 6, 2010, the situation in Mao border gate,
through which Muivah was expected to enter Manipur,
turned tense. A number of locals stormed a temporary
security barrack which lead the security personnel resort
to firing leaving three locals dead and fifty others,
including women, injured. After this incident and at
the request of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO),
Muivah postponed his visit to Somdal and camped himself
in Viswema village near the Mao gate on the inter-state
border of Nagaland and Manipur. The situation is still
at a stalemate with Muivah saying he would visit his
native village and Manipur government determined not
to not allow entry of Muivah in the state.
After the Manipur government denied entry to Muivah,
various Naga tribal groups launched an indefinite economic
blockade in Manipur. An economic blockade was already
in place in Manipur from April 11, 2010 by Naga groups
residing in Manipur protesting the state government’s
decision to hold autonomous council elections and after
the state government denied the entry of Muivah, the
Naga groups continued with the blockade. Hundreds of
trucks carrying essentials and medicines were stranded
in the adjoining state of Nagaland with protesters blocking
the National Highway 39, the main lifeline to Manipur.
The economic blockade is causing acute shortage of essential
commodities in the state. The government is now airlifting
the essential commodities to Manipur and using alternative
routes, like the National Highway 53, connecting Assam
with Manipur.
Eventually, on June 5, 2010, the Central Government
persuaded Muivah to leave Vishwema village where he
had been camping since May 6, 2010. The blockade of
NH-39 was lifted on June 18, 2010 after negotiations
with different Naga groups.
On November 31, 2010 Rajkumar Meghen alias Sana Yaima,
chairman of UNLF, was arrested from Motihari in East
Champaran district of Bihar. He had earlier gone missing
after being reportedly arrested in Bangladesh in September
2010.
Between 1992 and 2010, at least 5665 people were killed
in insurgency related incidents in Manipur. However,
the number of fatalities is showing a decreasing trend.
In 2008, there were 485 insurgency-related fatalities
which decreased to 416 in 2009 and in 2010 it fell down
to 138. Still, Manipur remains the most volatile state
in the north-eastern region. (source: www.satp.org)
The government, to start with, viewed the insurgency
problem in a pure law and order paradigm. Arrest of
many insurgent leaders during the war of liberation
in Bangladesh in 1971, appeared to have led to a gradual
decline in the insurgency before it was revived by the
PLA’s establishment in 1978. This necessitated
the declaration of the valley area as ‘disturbed’
and imposition of the Armed Forces (Special Powers)
Act, 1958, in September 1980. Security force campaigns
through a series of manoeuvres contained insurgency
till the later half of the 1980s. However, the resurgent
groups, along with a mushrooming of new outfits and
internecine conflicts between tribal groups, drove the
entire paradigm of insurgency to a completely different
plane in the early 1990s.
Whereas the insurgent outfits have remained completely
opposed to government appeals for peace, on 26 November
2000, the UNLF put forward three conditions for talks
with New Delhi. The outfit demanded that New Delhi should
include the agenda of sovereignty if it was truly serious
about its offer of talks adding that the Centre must
first ‘demilitarise’ the region and a third
country should monitor the talks. This was unacceptable
to the government. On 28 February 2001, Chief Minister
Radhabinod Koijam offered a unilateral month-long cease-fire,
commencing 1 March 2001 to 17 outfits in the State.
On 19 March 2001, Governor Ved Marwah announced the
setting up of a contact group to liaison with extremist
organisations in the State. However, these moves were
rejected by the outfits.
Civil society institutions and community based organisations
have been very influential in Manipur and have often
played significant role in the containment of conflict.
The Meira Paibis (women torch bearers) constitute one
such force. They have been active in protesting human
rights violations and unjustifiable arrests by the security
forces, and in taking action against social ills such
as drug abuse and alcoholism. Another women’s
movement in Manipur, the Nupi (Women’s) Movement,
has also organised many demonstrations for peace and
for the protection of human rights in the State. The
Manipur Chanura Leishem Marup (MACHA LEIMA) is another
leading women’s organisation, which has been organising
a series of human rights workshops for women in Manipur
since 1997. There are also several civil rights activists
and groups including the United Committee of Manipur
(UCM) in the State. Their concerns have focussed on
civil liberties and the violation of rights. Most of
them have been in the forefront of the anti-AFSPA agitation
in the state since August 2004, following the death
of an alleged PLA woman cadre Manorama Devi in the hands
of the Assam Rifles personnel.
Until the claim by the security establishment in 2005
of several rebel groups having entered into a truce
with the authorities, insurgents in Manipur were not
known to pursuing a soft approach. The Ministry of Defence
in a press release dated October 7, 2005, disclosed
that eight Kuki and one Zomi militant group in Manipur
had entered into an informal ‘ceasefire’
with the Government. 'Cessation of operations' agreements
were concluded with these groups with effect from August
1, 2005. It was like a ray of hope for Manipur that
has been under the grip of militants for years together.
But, this caused little difference to the levels of
militancy-related incidents and fatalities since the
strong and the prominent groups like the UNLF, the PLA,
the PREPAK and the KYKL were not willing for any kind
of negotiations.
The Government has at present signed Suspension of
Operations (SoO) with the Kuki rebel outfits. The Suspension
of Operation Agreement had been endorsed at New Delhi
by emissaries of Kuki rebels, the Centre and State government
respectively on 22 August, 2008. In March 2010, the
Union Home Secretary G.K.Pillai held a series of meetings
with the leaders of the Kuki National Front (KNF) in
Manipur and the talks between the government and the
outfit are expected to take place soon.
In September 2006, the UNLF, forwarded a four point
formula to start a plebiscite process for resolution
of the conflict in Manipur. These included, (1) A plebiscite
under United Nations (UN) supervision to elicit the
opinion of the people of the State on the core issue
of restoration of Manipur’s independence. (2)
Deployment of a UN peace-keeping force in Manipur to
ensure that the process is free and fair. (3) Surrender
of arms by the UNLF to the UN force, matched by the
withdrawal of Indian troops and (4) Handing over of
political power by the UN in accordance with the results
of the plebiscite. The proposal was rejected by the
State government.
Though many interpreted the move as a step forward
towards peace negotiation, it is for sure that the Government
of India would not accept the intervention of the UN
in what is invariably its internal problem. With the
outfit’s continued sticking to such conditions,
peace negotiation remains a distant dream under such
circumstances. Similar is the case with PLA when its
‘political wing’ president Irengbam Chaoren
reiterated that the outfit would not sit for peace talks
with the government when he addressed the ‘29th
raising day’ of the Revolutionary Peoples’
Front (RPF) on 24 February 2008.
In the face of the militants groups’ stubborn
opposition to the idea of negotiating with the Indian
government, army and police operations against them
has remained the key to the conflict management process
in Manipur. Several military operations have been led
by the unified command structure, which was established
in 2004, against the valley based militant outfits.
Their achievements have been limited and temporary.
On its part, the State government has been constantly
urging the militants to lay down their arms and surrender.
It is offering Rs. 5 Lakh as fixed deposit and a monthly
stipend of Rs.5,000 for those militants who surrender.
(Updated till 26 January, 2011)
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