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Northeast has been the land of thousand mutinies. Starting
with the Naga insurgency since India’s independence
in 1947, several insurgency movements have sprung up
in most of the constituent states of the region. At
one point of time, about 120 insurgent groups carried
out their activities in the seven states of the Northeast
(Sikkim was bracketed under Northeast in 2003). Demands
of the insurgent groups have been wide-ranging. While
groups like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),
NSCN-IM (National Socialist Council of Nagaland: Isak-Muivah
group) aim at establishing independent states, outfits
such as the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) demanded separate
states for their tribal constituency. Fringe outfits,
such as the United People’s Democratic Solidarity
(UPDS) and Dima Halam Daogah (DHD), confining their
activities to the geographical limits of separate districts
in Assam, have fought for maximum autonomy, within the
purview of the Indian constitution. Reasons behind dissent
against the Indian state too have been diverse. The
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) insurgencies in Tripura
are rooted in the sense of alienation of the indigenous
tribals as a result of the unhindered migration from
Bangladesh (formerly East Bengal / East Pakistan). The
ULFA, too started highlighting among others, Assam’s
sorry plight as a result of Bangladeshi migration. Several
outfits operating in the valley areas of Manipur protest
against the forcible accession of the state to the Indian
union and subsequent neglect of their language and the
delayed statehood conferred on the state. Apathy shown
by the central government to the population suffering
from a famine triggered the militancy in Mizoram spearheaded
by the Mizo National Front (MNF).
Insurgency in different states often overflowed into
the neighbouring states and contiguous regions. Tribal
populations belonging to the same stock/ clan are often
found on both sides of the boundaries between various
states and hence, the militant outfits find it convenient
to expand their activities to both the sides. For example,
the Hmar insurgency is noticed in all the Hmar inhabited
areas of Mizoram, Assam and Manipur. In addition, states
like Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh are used by the
insurgents to set up safe houses and also as transit
routes. Thus, both these states have been affected by
activities of ULFA, NDFB, NSCN cadres.
Numerical cadre strength of the outfits has varied
between 50 to few thousands. This, too, has undergone
constant change as a result of military operations,
desertions and recruitment patterns. Irrespective of
the numerical strength, however, the potency of the
insurgents is continuously sourced from popular support.
All most all the insurgency movements, to begin with,
have started off their campaign espousing popular causes
and have been seen by separate constituencies as a natural
by-product of the long-held grievances of the tribe/
people against the administration. It is a different
matter, altogether, that such popular support has eroded
as insurgency gradually bordered on the extremes of
mindless violence. The NLFT and ATTF in Tripura, today,
can hardly claim to represent the tribal population
in the state and have often targeted the latter with
extortion, abduction and killings. Similarly, the ULFA,
which had at one time almost ran a parallel government
in Assam and administered speedy justice, today finds
its support base only in few pockets of the state.
Insurgency related fatalities in the region are quite
alarming. Between 1992 and 2010 (till September 5),
the northeastern states of India recorded at least 19,379
fatalities. Maximum fatalities, within the said period,
have been recorded in Assam. The State, ravaged by about
38 insurgent outfits (at present about seven are active)
recorded at least 7,476 fatalities during this period.
Assam was followed by Manipur, where 35 militant outfits
(at present about 9 are active) accounted for at least
5,647 fatalities. (Source: www.satp.org)
On June 24, 2008, the Alfa and Charlie companies of
the ULFA's Myanmar-based 28th battalion declared a unilateral
ceasefire and came over-ground seeking a negotiated
settlement to their three-decade-old problem. They declared
that they would have no links with the ULFA and they
would be called as the “pro-talk ULFA faction”.
They also gave up the demand for sovereignty or independence
and said that they want to work towards achieving greater
autonomy for Assam. Other militant groups in Assam like
NDFB and DHD have also split up into pro-talk and anti-talk
factions. While the anti-talk faction of the DHD (DHD-J)
have laid down its arms on October 2, 2009, the anti-talk
factions of NDFB is still carrying on with extortion,
killings and other illegal activities in the region.
However, the leader of the anti-talk faction of NDFB,
Ranjan Daimari is in custody of the government since
May 1, 2010.
In Bangladesh, the crackdown against Indian militant
outfits by the Awami League Government brought in great
results towards the end of 2009, with arrests of top
leaders of the ULFA. On November 6, 2009, ULFA's 'foreign
secretary' Sashadhar Choudhury and 'finance secretary'
Chitraban Hazarika were handed over to the Indian authorities.
Within a month of these arrests, on December 4, 2009,
ULFA 'Chairman' Arabinda Rajkhowa and 'Deputy commander-in-chief'
Raju Baruah were handed over to the Indian authorities.
These arrests have weakened the outfit to a great extent
and Paresh Baruah, ULFA’s ‘commander-in-chief’,
is the sole remaining top leader in the outfit.
The region also saw quite a few major militant attacks
in recent times. On October 1, 2008, four blasts took
place in a span of 45 minutes in Radha Nagar, Gol Bazaar,
GB Bazaar and Krishna Nagar localities in Tripura’s
capital Agartala, injuring 74 persons. On October 30,
2008, nine bomb blasts rocked four towns across Assam,
killing 89 persons and injuring more than 300 people.
On July 8, 2010 the anti-talk faction of NDFB triggered
a powerful blast that flung the locomotive and two coaches
of Kolkata-bound Garib Rath Express from the tracks,
killing a six-year-old boy and injuring 23 others at
Gossaigaon in Kokrajhar district. On 26 July, 2010 the
same outfit killed four jawans of the Sashastra Seema
Bal and injured two others in an ambush at Amlaiguri
in Chirang district bordering Bhutan. On 30 July, 2010
ULFA triggered a landmine blast at Bhalukdubi in Goalpara
district, killing 5 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)
troopers and injuring 40 others. In Manipur, there were
incidents in which militants targeted VIPs, including
the Chief Minister.
There are also various incidents of ethnic tension
in the Northeast. In July 2008, clashes took place between
the Bodo tribe and the Muslim migrant settlers in Assam.
Again there was ethnic tension between the Zemi Naga
tribe and the Dimasas in N.C.Hills district in Assam
during March 2009. The internecine clashes in Nagaland
between the different factions of NSCN are still continuing.
Unemployment problem in the region stands as a major
cause for sustained insurgency. Thus lots of the unemployed
youths become easy target for recruitment for the insurgent
outfits. Extortion activities are also on a rise in
the region, with militants collecting extortion money
from almost everywhere, including educational institutions
and religious places. The extortion activities have
also disrupted the work of many important development
projects in the region.
Trans-national linkages have remained a crucial force-multiplier
for the insurgents in Northeast India. While the Naga
insurgents received patronage from the Chinese in the
1960s and 1970s, safe bases in countries including Bhutan,
Bangladesh and Myanmar have been used by the outfits
to sustain themselves. In December 2003, Bhutan launched
a military crackdown targeting the ULFA, NDFB and Kamatapur
Liberation Organization (KLO) militants. Such maneuvers
remain unrepeated in either Myanmar or Bangladesh. Myanmar,
since the 1980s, has conducted periodic onslaughts against
the militants, with only transitory results. The NSCN-K
(Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council
of Nagaland) and a number of outfits operating in Manipur
continue to maintain their facilities in that country.
In December 2001, 192 UNLF cadres, including the outfit’s
chairman Sana Yaima, were arrested by the Myanmarese
Army, but all of them were set free by February 2002.
According to Indian army sources, UNLF today supplies
arms and ammunition to various militant groups in the
Northeast with active connivance of Myanmar’s
security forces.
Bangladesh has been accused by the Indian authorities
of housing about 190 camps of the northeastern Indian
insurgents. Many top leaders of a number of outfits,
including the ULFA, NLFT, ATTF and KLO were based in
Dhaka, Chittagong and other cities. Their presence in
Bangladesh facilitated strategic and operational nexus
with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
The ISI, is not only known to have trained ULFA cadres,
but also has been accused by the Indian security agencies,
of having a decisive say over their activities in Assam.
However, after the Awami League Government came to power
in Bangladesh it initiated a crackdown on the Indian
insurgent outfits based in Bangladeshi soils. It has
led to the fleeing of top leaders of these outfits from
Bangladesh and trying to set up their bases at newer
areas, especially China.
Similarly, some of the outfits in the region have
also tried to wage their struggle in the international
level by associating themselves with international organisations.
Since, 1996, the ULFA has attended meetings of an international
organisation representing indigenous and minority groups
called the Unrepresented Nations People’s Organisation
(www.unpo.org) and the United Nations Group on Human
Rights (UNWGIP). The NSCN-IM, too, is a member of the
UNPO. The ULFA too has attended UNPO sessions. The NSCN-IM
maintains its office in Thailand and Netherlands. Such
attempts have provided the outfits with international
publicity, although the overall attempt of bringing
international pressure on New Delhi for resolving the
ongoing conflicts as per the wishes of the outfits has
been limited.
Easy availability of small arms in neighbouring countries
like Bangladesh and Myanmar has been another factor
behind the sustenance of insurgency in the region. Arms
have entered India’s Northeast from the Southeast
Asian markets through the region’s porous borders
with these countries. Inter-linkages between the outfits
have ensured the smooth transfer of military hardware
and the technology to use them. As a result, even the
weakest of the outfits, have access to sophisticated
arms and explosives. The NSCN has trained armed cadres
of several outfits active in different states in the
region. ULFA cadres, even today, continue to use the
NSCN-K facilities in Myanmar’s Sagaing division.
In a bid to sustain themselves and augment their firepower,
insurgent outfits have entered into several collaborations
among themselves. In Manipur, on March 1, 1999 the UNLF,
PREPAK and PLA formed the Manipur People’s Liberation
Front (MPLF), which exists even today. The NSCN-IM,
formed the United Liberation Front of Seven Sisters
(ULFSS) in 1993 and the Self-Defence United Front of
the South-East Himalayan Region (SDUFSEHR) in November
1994. These two groupings are not active. Prior to that
on 22 May 1990, the UNLF, along with the NSCN-K and
the ULFA floated a pan-Mongoloid coalition called the
Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) to wage a "united
struggle for the independence of Indo-Burma". The
IBRF remained defunct for a number of years, although
reports in November 2007 indicate attempts at reviving
it.
However, during the last few years, there has been
a decline in insurgency in the region. In Tripura, effective
counter-insurgency measures have reduced the insurgency
problem to a great extent. Mizoram, Meghalaya, Sikkim
and Arunachal Pradesh are also quite peaceful and have
witnessed only stray insurgency-related incidents. In
Assam, the situation has been comparatively peaceful
since 2009 after the arrests of top leaders of the ULFA
and lying down of arms by DHD-J and KLNLF. However,
the situation in Manipur is yet problematic and worrisome.
In Nagaland, even though there are not much violent
incidents, both the NSCN factions (NSCN-IM and NSCN-K)
are still carrying on with its unlawful activities.
Both these factions are in ceasefire with the Central
Government but are still involved in clashes between
themselves.
State response to insurgency movements in the Northeast
has been a complex mix of military operations, developmental
packages, surrender schemes, peace overtures and emphasis
on harnessing the economic potential of the region.
While military operations formed a crucial component
of the counter-insurgency campaigns in Mizoram and Nagaland
in the period between 1950s and 1970s, New Delhi, starting
in the 1990s, was inclined to dole out economic largesse
for the region in a bid to win away insurgency through
developmental schemes. The ability of the state police
forces to match the insurgents, with access to sophisticated
weapons, has been found wanting. As a result, it has
been a trend on the part of each of the states to depend
on the deployment of the army and para-military forces.
Three states, Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh,
have set up the unified command structure (UCS) mechanism,
to coordinate the activities of the police, para-military
and army personnel. While Assam set up the UCS in 1997,
Manipur replicated the mechanism in 2004 and Arunachal
Pradesh in 2008.
Success of such attempts has remained rare. With the
exception of the Mizo National Front (MNF) rebellion
that ended in 1986 and the BLT uprising that culminated
in a peace deal in 2003, insurgency in India’s
Northeast has continued unabated, with or without transient
dips in violence.
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